Risk-based Capital Standards for Banks: 
A Critique

There is a consensus on the need to impose minimum capital requirements on banks. However, there exists far less agreement about how this minimum amount of capital should be calculated. This paper presents a critique of the form of the risk-based capital standards known as Basel I & II. The substance of basing capital adequacy requirements on risk sensitivity remains unquestionable. Absolute rules on banks' minimum paid-up capital or shareholders' funds are considered useful only to the extent that they serve as complementary or temporary measure to address the potential uncertainties in the accuracy of risk exposure. It examines the likely implications of the Basel II Capital Accord for the Nigerian banking system and advises that the CBN should consider carefully the cost implication of the new Accord before developing timetable for its implementation.

Key Words: Banks minimum capital requirement, Credit risk, Market risk, Operational risk, Basel I & II capital accords, Risk weighted assets, Benchmark risk weights.

JEL Classification Numbers: G 21

I. Introduction

Risk-based capital standards require banks to hold capital in relation to their risk exposure. In the recent past, bank regulators specified minimum capital standards for banks that were independent of their underlying risks. In 1986, the United States Federal Banking Agencies proposed adoption of a risk-based capital measure that would take explicit account of broad differences in risk in a banking organization's assets and off-balance sheet items. The risk-based capital proposed was aimed at fostering co-ordination among supervisory authorities in the U.S. In 1987, a new risk-based capital rules were proposed based on a joint US/UK agreement. The scope of the international effort was expanded further when the Basel

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Committee on Banking Supervision modified and extended the US/UK agreement to set internationally consistent capital standards for the G10 countries plus Luxembourg. The report of the Committee titled “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standard” also called the “Basel Accord I” or “BIS I” was presented in July 1988. While the Accord was initially applied to internationally-active banks in the 12 industrial countries, it quickly became acknowledged as a model for capital regulation of the banking system in both developed and developing economies. It is believed to have been adopted in some form by more than 100 countries, including Nigeria.

The basic aim of the regulation is to require that banks maintain sufficient capital to absorb unforeseen losses. Broad agreement exists about the need to impose minimum capital requirement in order to maintain the stability of the financial system, however, there exists far less agreement about how this minimum amount of capital should be calculated. As a result, the original risk-based capital standards have been subject to heavy criticisms by academics, practitioners and regulators.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has responded severally to these criticisms by proposing alternative capital rules. After extensive consultations with bank supervisory authorities worldwide, the final document of this proposal known as the New Capital Accord was presented and endorsed by Central Bank Governors and Heads of Banking Supervision of the G10 countries in June 2004, with an amendment in November 2005. The document was circulated to bank supervisory authorities' worldwide with view to encouraging them to adopt the New Accord as a global product. The new framework will be available for implementation in member jurisdictions as of year-end 2006. The most advanced approaches to risk measurement will be available for the year-end 2007.

Now that banks the world over are aligning their internal practices and behaviour to the New Accord, it is advisable to discuss the implications of the implementation of the New Accord for the Nigerian banking system. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to review the original and new risk-based capital standards (Basel I & II Accords) and the criticisms that characterized both
Accordingly, the paper is structured as follows: section two following the introduction discusses the role of capital and capital requirements in banks; section three reviews the Basel I and II Accords; section four reviews the criticisms of both rules; section five outlines the likely implications of the New Accord for the Nigerian banking system; and section six concludes the paper with some remarks.

II. The Role of Capital and Capital Requirement in Banks

There is a consensus in the banking literature that the function of owners' capital in bank is to reduce bank risk (Berger et al, 1995), (Altman and Saunders, 1995), (Rose, 1996), (Koch and Macdonald, 2000), (Adewumi, 1997), (Peeks and Rosengreen, 1995). It does so in so many ways. First, it provides a cushion to absorb bank losses. Owners' capital absorbs losses from bad loans, poor securities investment, and crime and management misjudgement so that the bank keeps operating until its problems are corrected or its losses are recovered. It is only when the bank's losses are so large that they overwhelm not only all other defences but also owners' capital will the institution be forced to close its doors. Thus, owners' capital is the bank's last line of defence against failure. Second, bank equity capital provides ready access to financial markets by promoting public confidence in a bank and reassuring its creditors and depositors of the bank's financial strength. The level and adequacy of a bank's capital are factors “an educated depositor” would consider in deciding which bank to put his money. Ordinarily, it will be difficult for a bank with ₦1 million equity capital to attract a bank deposit of ₦8 million (Adewumi, 1997). Third, equity capital serves as a regulator of a bank's growth. Peek and Rosengreen (1995) found that hundreds of smaller banks with weak capital base disappeared through mergers because of burgeoning growth in large business loans, which could only be made by bigger banks with stronger capital base. Also, according to the Nigerian banking laws, the maximum loan that can be made to a single borrower must not be more than 20% of shareholders' funds unimpaired by losses. Banks
whose shareholders' funds fail to grow fast enough find themselves losing market share in the competition for the largest borrowing customers. In addition, banks that fail to maintain the prescribed minimum capital ratios are prohibited from advertising for or accepting new deposits, granting credit, making investment and paying cash dividend to shareholders.

Literature that relate to the role of capital adequacy requirements on bank behaviour include Blum (1999), Chuiri et al (2002), Altman et al (2002), Berger and Udoli (1991), Altman and Saunders (2001). Chiuri et al (2002) found in their study that the enforcement of capital requirement has a negative effect on the supply of bank loans in emerging countries. To meet minimum capital requirements, banks studied cut back lending when it was too costly to raise new capital. They, therefore, suggested caution in the process of raising minimum capital requirements in emerging economies, where external financing from non-bank financial institutions is generally weak. They recommended adequate phased-in procedures to be considered by emerging economies planning to introduce new and higher capital requirements.

Using a simple budget or accounting constraint models based on earlier work of Peek and Rosengreen (1995), Altman et al (2002) showed another instance where increasing capital requirements induced banks to cut back on their loans. A comprehensive paper by the Bank Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) survey on the response of banks in the G10 countries to the enforcement of the 1988 capital adequacy requirements confirmed the evidence that bank capital pressures could limit bank lending.

Regulators, concerned primarily with the safety and soundness of banks and the stability of the financial system, prefer more equity capital in banks. This reduces the likelihood of failure and frequency of supervision as well as increases bank liquidity. Bankers on the other hand, generally prefer to operate with less capital. The smaller is a bank equity base, the greater is financial leverage and equity multiplier. High leverage converts normal return on assets into a high return on equity (ROE). This conflict in interest between banks and regulators makes it possible for banks to exploit any available loophole in capital requirements rules to engage in regulatory arbitrage.
The technical challenge for both banks and regulators has been how to determine capital adequacy requirements. Increasing equity beyond market requirement reduces the value of the bank, increases its weighted average cost of finance, and imposes social costs. Capital requirements must be consistent with the economic intent of the requirements. Thus, capital regulation involves a trade-off between the marginal social benefit of reducing risk of the negative externality from bank failures and the marginal social cost of diminishing intermediation (Berger et al, 1991).

Ideal regulatory capital requirements would equate the marginal social cost of higher capital with the marginal social benefit for each bank for each period. For example, a bank that poses no significance externalities would be assigned a relatively low capital requirement, while a bank that is likely to transmit shocks to other banks would be subjected to high capital requirement. The requirement would be continuously updated with changes in the risk position of each bank. However, implementation of such an ideal framework would be very expensive. Regulators lack precise estimates of social costs and benefits to make capital requirement suitable for each bank and cannot easily revise the requirements continuously as conditions change.

In practice capital regulation stipulates uniform, minimum ratios below which banks are subject to regulatory sanctions. This minimum remains relatively stable over time and compliance is monitored by on-site examinations and routine inspection of banks' reports.

III. Review of Basel I & II Accords

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, a group of central banks and bank supervisory authorities in 12 industrial countries developed and presented the Basel I Accord in July 1988. The Accord was originally intended for internationally active banks in G10 countries, but more than 100 countries have adopted variant form of the Accord.

The 1988 Accord relates bank capital adequacy requirement to credit risk exposure reflecting the perception that credit risk poses the most serious threat
to bank solvency. Other types of risks were to be incorporated later. For instance, the Committee amended the 1988 Accord to take account of capital requirements for market risks in 1996. This amendment was modified in September 1997 and November 2005. It adopted two alternative approaches to the measurement of market risk: a standardized method and internal models approach.

The 1988 Accord or Basel I

There are two components of the 1988 Accord. These include:

1. The measurement of qualifying capital, the numerator and
2. The determination of risk-weighted assets, the denominator.

Qualifying Capital

Under the Accord, qualifying regulatory capital is categorized into tier 1 and tier 2 capitals. The tier 1 or core capital comprises common stock, retained earnings, surplus, non-cumulative preferred stock, minority interest in equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries and selected identifiable intangible assets. Tier 2 or supplementary capital includes qualifying subordinated debt, cumulative preferred stock, capital certificates, and loan loss reserves in an amount not to exceed 25% of risk-weighted assets, non-withdrawal accounts and pledged deposits not included in core capital. Supplementary capital items are considered less stable protection against losses. The total capital of a bank could be derived from the sum of tier 1 and tier 2 capitals. Some assets are deducted from capital. These include goodwill, other intangible assets that do not meet qualitative test, investment in subsidiaries that are not consolidated and some reciprocal holdings of capital requirements of banking organizations. Goodwill is deducted directly from core capital, while other deductions are from total capital.
Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA)

The denominator of the risk-based Basel I Accord measures banks' credit risk exposure. Calculation of risk-weighted asset (RWA) is accomplished by multiplying each asset item on a bank's balance sheet and any off-balance sheet commitment by risk weighting factor designed to reflect the credit risk exposure and summing the weighted categories to create risk weighted assets. For on-balance sheet items, 0 percent risk weight is assigned to the following asset category: cash, deposit at the Central Bank of Nigeria, treasury bills, notes and bonds issued by government of the world leading industrial countries belonging to the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and well-secured claims backed by cash, or deposits, or by OECD central governments. 20 percent risk weight is assigned to the following asset category: cash items in the process of collection, inter-bank deposits, general obligation bond and notes issued by States and Local governments and securities issued or backed by Federal government agencies.

50 percent risk weight is assigned to moderate risk assets such as residential mortgages, loan on one-to-four family dwellings, selected multi family-housing loans that are well secured and adequately performing and reserve bonds issued by state and local government units or agencies. 100 percent risk weight is assigned to highest risk assets such as commercial and industrial loans, credit cards loans, real property assets, investment in bank subsidiary company and all other bank assets not listed above.

For off-balance sheet items, the notional value of off-balance sheet items are first converted to on-balance sheet “credit equivalent” amounts. The credit equivalent amounts are then assigned risk weight applicable to the counter party or underlying collateral.

Under the risk-based Basel I Accord, a bank should hold tier 1 capital at least equal to 4% of risk-weighted assets. Tier 1 plus tier 2 capital should be at least equal to 8% of risk-weighted assets. A tier 2 capital is limited to no more than tier 1 capital. There is an additional supervising leverage requirement that institutions with the highest examination ratings that meet certain other
conditions must hold tier 1 capital at least equal to 3% of unweighted assets.

The formula for calculating capital adequacy ratio under the BIS I is Capital Adequacy Ratio:

\[
\frac{\text{Total tier 1+ Tier 2 Capital}}{\text{Total Risk Weighted Assets}} \quad \ldots \ldots \ldots (1)
\]

**The New Accord or Revised Framework or Basel II**

Due to the limitations of the 1988 Accord, which are highlighted in the next section, there has been broad-based pressure to radically review this Accord. The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision presented the final document of the new proposal for establishing minimum capital requirement for banking organizations in June 2004, with some amendments in November 2005. The document is titled “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework”. The New Accord represents the outcome of the Committee's extensive consultations with bank supervisory authorities' worldwide to secure international convergence on revision to regulations governing capital adequacy of internationally active banks. The Committee presented the first round of the proposal in June 1999 and subsequently released additional proposals for consultation in January 2001 and April 2003. It also conducted three quantitative impact studies related to its proposals. The New Framework and the standard it contains have been endorsed by the Central Bank Governors and Head of Banking Supervision of the G10 countries.

The Basel II retains the key elements of the 1988 capital adequacy framework including the general requirement for banks to hold eligible capital equivalent to at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets. It also retains the definition of qualifying or eligible capital and the basic structure of the 1996 treatment of market risk.

The Basel II Framework is packaged in the form of three mutually reinforcing pillars. The first pillar represents a significant strengthening of the minimum
requirements set out in the 1988 Accord, while the second and third pillars represent innovative additions to capital supervision and market discipline.

**Pillar I: Minimum Capital Requirements**

For providing capital charge for credit risk, two principal options have been proposed. There is the standardized approach and the internal rating based (IRB) approach. The standardized approach is conceptually the same as that found in the 1988 Accord, but is more risk sensitive. Under this approach, the bank allocates a risk-weight to each of its assets and off-balance sheet positions and produces a sum of risk-weighted asset values. A risk weight of 100% means that an exposure is included in the calculation of risk weighted assets at its full value, which translates into a capital charge equal to 8% of that value. Similarly, a risk weight of 150% results in a capital charge of 12% (i.e. 150% of 8%) and a risk weight of 20% produces a capital charge of 1.6% (i.e. 20% of 8%). The risk weights would be based on the rating from eligible external credit assessment institutions (ECAI) of borrowers (see Table 1 in the appendix for more detail). Table 1 in the appendix summaries the various options allowed under the standardized approach for slotting exposure according to ratings from eligible external rating agencies (BIS, 2001)

Banks that engage in more sophisticated risk-taking and that have developed advanced risk measurement systems may, with the approval of their supervisors select from one of two internal ratings based approach (IRB). The goal of the IRB approach is to align more accurately capital requirements with the intrinsic amount of credit risk to which a bank is exposed. The IRB approach is built on the concept of estimating borrowers' probability of default (PD) based on the historical default experience of the bank. Banks should also measure how much loss they will suffer should a borrower default on an exposure. This is the term Loss Given Default (LGD) and is expressed as a percentage of the exposure. The amount to which the bank is exposed to the borrower at the time of default is expressed as exposure at default (EAD). Under the IRB approach, banks will be allowed to use their internal estimates of borrowers' creditworthiness to assess credit risk in their portfolio, subject to strict methodological and disclosure standards.
The framework allows for two approaches to IRB, namely, the foundation and advanced approach. In the foundation approach banks estimate the probability of default (PD) associated with each borrower, and the supervisor will supply other inputs. In the advanced approach, a bank with a sufficiently developed internal capital allocations process will be allowed to supply its own data for loss given default, maturity adjustment factor, and exposure at default (EAD).

**Operational Risk**

The new framework establishes an explicit capital charge for a bank's exposures to operational risk. Three different approaches of increasing sophistication have been proposed. These include basic indicator, standardized, and internal measurement. The basic indicator approach utilizes one indicator of operational risk for a bank's total activity. The standardized approach specifies different indicators for different business lines, while the internal measurement approach requires banks to utilize their internal loss data in the estimation of required capital. Similar to the range of options provided for assessing exposures to credit risk, banks will choose one of three approaches for measuring their exposures to operational risk that they and their supervisors agree reflects the quality and sophistication of their internal controls.

**Calculation of RWA for Corporate Exposures**

In the foundation approach, corporate exposures will receive a risk weight (RW) that depends on PD and LGD (after recognizing any credit enhancements from collateral, guarantees or credit derivatives). The average maturity of all exposures will be assumed to be three years. A corporate exposure's risk weight, RW\(_C\), would be calculated according to the following formula:

\[
RW_C = \frac{(LGD/50) \times BRWC}{PD} \quad \text{or} \quad 12.5 \times LGD, \quad \text{which ever is smaller.} \]

(2)

The PD & LGD are expressed as whole numbers rather than decimals. For
examples, LGD of 100% will be written as 100. The BRW (PD) represents the corporate benchmark risk weight associated with a given PD. The values for benchmark risk weight for a hypothetical corporate exposure having LGD of 50% are represented in Table 3 in the appendix.

In the advanced approach, or where there is an explicit maturity dimension in the foundation approach, for an exposure with effective maturity (m) different from 3 years, an asset's maturity adjusted risk weight would be calculated by scaling up or down the corporate benchmark risk weight for a hypothetical 3-year loan having the same PD and LGD. Thus, a corporate exposure's risk weight in the advanced approach, RWc, can be expressed by the following formula:

\[ RWc = \frac{\text{LGD}}{50} \times BRWc(PD) \times [1 + b(PD) \times (M - 3)], \text{or } 12.5 \times \text{LGD}, \]

which ever is smaller. .................................................................(3)

In this expression, BRWc (PD) is the corporate benchmark risk weight associated with PD and the term \(1+b(PD) \times (M-3)\) is a multiplicative scaling factor, linear in M, where the maturity adjustment factor \(b(PD)\) is also a function of PD.

**Calculation of Benchmark Risk Weight (BRW)**

On the basis of the pooled survey and model-based evidence, the following continuous function formulated by Gordy (2001) was selected as providing a reasonable representation of the relationship between a corporate borrower's PD and the associated risk weight for a benchmark loan to that borrower having a 3-year maturity and LGD equal to 50%.

\[ BRWc(PD) = 976.5 \times N(1.118 \times G(PD) + 1.288) \times (1+0.047 \times \frac{(1-PD)}{PD^{0.41}}) \]

Where PD is in decimal, \(N(x)\) denotes the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable. \(G(z)\) denotes the inverse cumulative
The term \( N (1.118 \times G (PD) + 1.288) \) represents the sum of expected and unexpected losses associated with a hypothetical, infinitely granular portfolio of one-year loan having an LGD of 100%.

The term \( (1+0.047 \times (1- PD)/PD) \) is an adjustment to reflect that the IRB benchmark risk weights are calibrated to a 3-year average maturity;

The scaling factor 976.5, which is calibrated so that IRB benchmark risk weight equals 100% for values of PD and LGD equal to 0.7% and 5%, respectively.

**Calculation of RW\(_R\) and BRW\(_R\) for Retail Exposures**

Retail exposures will receive a risk weight that depends on PD and LGD, after recognizing any credit enhancement from collateral, guarantees or credit derivatives. The risk weight for a retail exposure would not depend on the maturity (M) of the exposure. The following formula would be used to calculate risk weight to a retail exposure:

\[
RW = \frac{LGD}{50} \times BRW (PD) \text{ or } 12.5 \times LGD, \text{ which ever is smaller.} \]

\[
\text{.................................................................................................................................................................... (5)}
\]

The PD and LGD are whole numbers and not decimals. In this expression, \( RW\) represents the risk weight associated with given values of PD for retail exposures, while \( BRW\) denotes the benchmark risk weight associated with a given PD, which is calibrated to an LGD of 50%.

The \( BRW\) is assigned to each exposure reflecting the PD of the exposure based on the following formula:

\[
BRW (PD) = 976.5 \times N (1.043 \times G (PD) + 0.766) + (1 + 0.047 \times (1- PD)/PD^{0.44}) \]  
\[
\text{.................................................................................................................................................................... (6)}
\]

Where \( N \) denotes the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable and \( G \) represents the inverse cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable (i.e. the value \( x \) such that \( N (x) = z \))
Table 4 shows the benchmark risk weight for retail exposure on the basis of a given PD and calibrated to a 50% LGD.

**Pillar II: Supervisory Review Process**

More specifically, the supervisory review process under the new Accord is based on the following principles:

- To ensure that banks have adequate capital to support all the risk in their business and to encourage banks to develop and use better risk management techniques in monitoring and managing their risks.

- Banks' management are expected to develop an internal assessment process and setting capital targets that are commensurate with the bank's risk profile and control environment.

- Supervisors are expected to evaluate how well banks are assessing their capital needs relative to their risks and to intervene were appropriate.

- Supervisors are to ensure that each bank has sound internal control and effective risk management process.

**Pillar III: Market Discipline and Reporting**

Pillar III encourages market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements which will allow market participants to assess key pieces of information on the scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes and, hence, the capital adequacy of the institution. In principle banks' disclosure should be consistent with how senior management and board of directors assess and manage the risks of the bank.

The Basel II Framework sets out the details for adapting more risk-sensitive minimum capital requirement for banking organizations. It reinforces this risk-sensitivity requirement by setting out principles for banks to assess the adequacy of their capital and for supervisors to review such assessments to
ensure that banks have adequate capital to support their risks. It also seeks to strengthen market discipline by enhancing transparency in banks' financial reporting.

Another principal change in the new framework is the granting of greater flexibility to banks to determine their appropriate level of equity capital that can absorb expected losses.

IV. A Critique of the Basel I & II Accords

Basel I Accord

The Basel I Accord has been widely criticized by practitioners, academics, regulators and supervisory authorities based on the following limitations.

- **Focus on a Single Risk Measure**: One of the most glaring shortcomings of the 1988 Accord on bank capital is its failure to incorporate significant measure of banks' risk exposures. The risk weights were designed primarily to take account of credit risk. But banks also face significant market and operational risks. Market risk is the losses a bank may suffer due to adverse change in interest rates, security prices, currency, and commodity prices. While operational risk is the losses incurred due to variation in operating expenses resulting from breakdown in quality control, inefficiencies in producing and delivering services, management misjudgement, etc.

- **Standardized Risk Weights Not Related To Actual Risk**: Research evidence shows that the standardized risk weights in the Accord do not correspond well with actual risk. Avery and Berger (1991) found that some of the weights on the asset categories are out of line with the future performance results and that the explanatory power of the regression was limited. Bradley et al (1991) found that the risk-weighted assets for banks were positively related to the probability of failure and accounting measure of risk, but the risk-weights in risk-weighted assets were often out of alignment with actual risk. Cordell and King (1995)
obtained similar results, but used an entirely different methodology. They applied option-pricing methods to market data on publicly traded banks and thrifts to measure their risks. They found numerous problems with the relative risk weights for both banks and thrifts, and concluded that accounting measures of capital may overstate the actual value of capital that is available to absorb losses.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision when presenting an earlier version of the new accord in 1999 said:

“The current risk-weighting of asset results, at best, is a crude measure of economic risk, primarily because degrees of credit risk exposure are not significantly calibrated as to adequately differentiate between borrowers differing default risk” (BCBS, 1999).

These literature reviews provide enough evidence to corroborate the fact that the standardized risk weights in the original Accord do not represent actual measure of risk.

- **Broad-Brush Structure of Risk**: The 1988 Accord has been criticized for its broad-brush structure of risk categories, which does not give consideration for credit quality. A better way to understand this argument is to look at the categories of assets under corporate loans that are assigned the same risk weights. Under the Accord, all commercial and industrial loans are assigned risk weight of 100%. This means that a triple A rated loan has the same risk weight with a triple C junk bond. A bank would have to hold the same capital for these broad classes of assets. The broad-brush nature of risk categories in the Accord gives scope for a bank to arbitrage between economic assessment of risk and the regulatory capital requirements (BIS, 1999; 21). If assets with different risk-return characteristics have the same capital requirements, banks favour those assets that offer a relatively high-expected rate of return. They can engage in regulatory arbitrage and choose relatively risky asset offering the highest expected return among those with certain capital requirement (Benink and Wihlhorg, 2002).
One Size Fit All: The 1988 Accord prescribes uniform capital requirement for all banks irrespective of the level of advances they reached in risk management techniques. Innovations in the market have enabled banks from various countries to make use of sophisticated financing techniques to effectively arbitrage between banks' risk and minimum capital levels. One technique used is securitization. Securitization can lead to a shift in banks portfolio concentration to lower quality assets. According to the research carried out by the Bank for International Settlements Working Party on Bank Capital and Behaviour, the empirical evidence on the impact of the 1988 Accord over a ten-year period revealed significant amount of securitization related arbitrage undertaken by US, Canadian, European and Japanese banks' (BIS, 2001).

No Consideration is Given to Tenor: Whether a facility is for one year or ten years, the capital requirement is the same. This gives incentive for banks to provide excessive short-term facilities. It also misrepresents the risks banks take on with longer-term facilities.

Manipulation of RWA: Another potential problem with the original Accord is that the risk-weighted asset (RWA) used as a denominator may be subject to manipulation by bank management. Banks may be able to restructure their transaction to reduce their capital requirements without reducing their actual risk exposures. Merton (1995) provided an example of how the current RWA can be circumvented by using a portfolio of mortgages.

The Way Forward

Improvement on the imperfections of the 1988 Accord can be suggested in the following areas:

To avoid regulatory arbitrage, risk-weighting system should be detailed and based on the “true” or “best available” measure of risk of each particular asset. Jones and King (1995) showed that risk weight in assets
that are classified as substandard; doubtful or loss can improve RWA. Thus, by giving more weight to classified assets, a modified RWA is likely to be closer to the “true” measure of the credit risk.

- Specifying risk categories with narrow limits can reduce the incentive for banks to develop expertise in regulatory arbitrage. The BCBS own survey on banks' practices in credit risk assessment (BCBS, 2002) showed that banks' practices vary from highly intuitive placement of credits into risk categories to the use of fairly sophisticated risk assessment models.

- Any proposal that incorporates the significant risks that banks face outside credit risk may be an improvement on the Basel I Accord.

- Any proposal that takes account of maturity factor of credit in determining RWA may also be an improvement on the current Accord.

**Critique of the Basel II Framework**

- A substantial challenge facing banks and supervisors of the internal rating approach in the New Accord is to map an internal rating method into risk-weights that are consistent across banks.

- The potential for risk arbitrage existing under the current Accord may remain to an extent under the IRB system in the New Accord as well. Because risk weights are based on banks' private information rather than on externally verifiable facts, supervisors may have difficulties in verifying the truthfulness of banks' estimates. This may give room for banks to use their private credit risk information to circumvent risk weighting presented to the regulatory authorities.

One type of “gaining and manipulation” would occur if a bank uses its private information to place relatively high-risk and high-return credit in a lower risk category. The quantitative importance of gaining and manipulation has been estimated by Carey and Hrycay (2000). They concluded that officially
reported default rate for a given rating can be made as low as half the banks' private estimates.

It may be suggested to impose penalties on banks that systematically and deliberately understate risk. However, penalties system may lack credibility if imposed on banks in distress.

**Pillar II** Proposals have been criticized as not having a very clear demarcation line between the responsibilities of the banks themselves and those of the regulators (Gabarretta, 2003)

**V. Implication of the New Accord for the Nigerian Banking System**

Although the new framework's focus is primarily on international active banks, its underlying principles are intended to be suitable for application to banks of varying levels of complexity and sophistication. The document embodying the New Accord has been circulated to bank supervisory authorities worldwide with a view to encouraging them to consider its adoption at such time as they believe is consistent with their broader supervisory priorities. The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, therefore, expects the New Accord to be adhered to by all significant banks after a period of time.

Therefore, although all the twenty-five consolidated banks in Nigeria as of January 2006 might not be internationally active, at least a number of them would surely possess those inherent characteristics that would qualify them as significant banks. It is expected that the CBN, which adopted the 1988 Accord, would also adopt the New Accord in the near future. It is, therefore, pertinent to discuss the likely implications of the New Accord for the Nigerian banking system.

- Under the Pillar II of the New Accord, most of the burden of controlling banks internal risk assessment is placed on expanded and active supervision. This requires additional human resources in the supervisory function. For Nigeria to adopt the new proposal, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is expected to build up its expertise substantially
in both qualitative and quantitative terms.

- Basel II calls for banking organization to store substantial quantity of data. To produce a measure of Risk-Weighted Assets, the BIS require banks to store a comprehensive database of operational loss incidents, financial instruments, credit losses, and general ledger data. Banks that seek to calculate pillar 1 capital using the advanced IRB approach also require seven years of default data.

- The cost of setting up an appropriate Basel II complaint risk control system is likely to be a formidable challenge for both banks and regulators. It has been estimated that the implementation and compliance cost - using a net present value basis over 5-years period with 5% reference rate - of Basel II could possibly exceed US $ 1000 billion (Gabarette, 2003:69). This is equivalent to about one half of the value of tier 1 capital held by banks worldwide. Since the concept of internal rating system is still new to Nigerian banks, it is likely that the adoption of the advanced IRB approach could require a huge cost outlay. The issue of cost effectiveness in this regard cannot be ignored. The benefit of adopting the IRB approach has to be balanced with the cost.

- The proposal precludes less developed banks from using the IRB approach, which requires less capital. This has implications regarding the competitive position of less and well developed banks.

- The high-risk profile of Nigerian sovereign (external) debt resulting from huge debt overhang implies low ratings from external rating agencies. This could result in higher cost of credit for the public sector as a direct consequence of both standardized and IRB approaches.

- Notwithstanding that the incentive to move to more advanced approaches is inherent in the structure of the New Accord; one can safely say that the standardized approach will be used by most banks in Nigeria for some years before they could reach the level of sophistication in risk management envisaged by the New Accord. The
standardized approach relies on ratings from external credit rating agencies. In Nigeria there are only 3 known credit rating agencies registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). They include Agusto & Co. Ltd, CMC International and West African Rating and Pharez. However, out of these three, only the first two are readily accessible and produce solicited and unsolicited credit assessment of businesses. Their coverage is still low for meaningful implementation of the new proposal. This implies that more credit rating agencies have to be established to specialize in assessing local companies and banks.

Again, the new Accord provides national supervisors the possibility of determining whether external credit assessment institution (ECAI) meets a number of eligibility criteria in order for it's rating to be used for capital purposes. These criteria include objectivity, independence, transparency, information disclosure, sufficient resources and credibility on the part of the ECAI. So the issue is not just to establish ECAI, but also to establish ECAI that will pass the eligibility criteria.

VI. Concluding Remarks

The critique attempted in this paper is based on the form of the rules in Basel I & II Capital Accords, and not on the substance of establishing capital adequacy rules based on risk sensitivity.

Capital adequacy must be measured in relation to factors that significantly affect banking organizations. Banks are mostly affected by the risk they assume. They are affected by the risk that credit extended to customers will decline in value and perhaps become worthless as a result of default (credit risk). They are mostly affected by the volatility in interest rates, security prices, foreign exchange rates and commodity prices (market risk). They are also affected by the fact that operating expenses might vary significantly from what is expected (operational risk). These risks reduce the value of banks' assets over time.

Principally customers' deposits, owners' capital and creditors finance bank's assets. Regulators, particularly concerned with the interest of depositors,
advocate that owners' capital should be adequate enough to absorb the gradual depreciation in asset value resulting from risk exposure. Therefore, it is proper and sensible to base rules on capital adequacy requirements on risk sensitivity. Absolute rules on minimum paid-up capital or shareholders' funds are only useful to the extent that they serve as supplementary or temporary measure to address the potential uncertainties in the accuracy of measure of risk exposure.

Basel II is flexible enough to allow national supervisory authorities the freedom to adopt supplementary measure of capital adequacy for banking organizations in their jurisdictions. The absolute rules on minimum paid-up capital or shareholders' funds in Nigeria should therefore serve as supplement to the risk-based capital standards of Basel II. However, its imposition should not be too abrupt and too high to induce disruptive panic in the banking system. Banks should be given enough time to comply through adequate phased-in program.

The CBN should recognize the relationship that exists between the amount of capital held by the bank against its risk and the strength and effectiveness of the bank's risk management and internal control process. Increased capital should not be viewed as the only option for addressing increased risks confronting the bank. Other means for addressing risk such as strengthening the level of provision and reserves and improving internal controls must also be considered. Overall, capital should not be regarded as substitute for addressing fundamentally inadequate control or risk management process.

Moving towards the adoption of Basel II in the near future may not be a first priority for Nigeria in terms of what is needed to strengthen its supervision. The CBN should consider carefully the cost implications of the New Accord for the banking system before developing timetable for its implementation.
References


BCBS (1999), Update on Work on New Capital Adequacy Framework, November, BIS.

BCBS (2001a), The Internal Ratings-Based Approach: Consultative Document, BIS.


BCBS (2003), The New Basel Capital Accord: Third Consultative Paper, April, BIS.

BCBS (2004), International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards: a Revised Framework June, BIS.


## Appendix

### Table 1: The Standardized Approach Using Standard & Poor’s Methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claim</th>
<th>AAA to AA-</th>
<th>A+ to A-</th>
<th>BBB+ to BBB-</th>
<th>BB+ to B-</th>
<th>Below B-</th>
<th>Unrated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sovereign</td>
<td>0% (1)</td>
<td>20% (2)</td>
<td>100% (4-6)</td>
<td>150% (7)</td>
<td>100% (8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks : Option 1a</td>
<td>20% (20%)</td>
<td>100% (50%)</td>
<td>150% (150%)</td>
<td>100% (20%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 1b</td>
<td>50% (50%)</td>
<td>50% (20%)</td>
<td>50% (50%)</td>
<td>50% (20%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BB+ to BB-</td>
<td>Below BB-</td>
<td>Unrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Mortgages</td>
<td>20% (20%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>150% (150%)</td>
<td>100% (20%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other retail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BB+ to BB-</td>
<td>Below BB-</td>
<td>Unrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BB+ to BB-</td>
<td>Below BB-</td>
<td>Unrated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Risk weighting based on risk weighting of sovereign in which the bank is incorporated, but one category less favourable.

b. Risk weighting based on the assessment of the individual bank.

c. Claims on banks of a short original maturity, less than three months, would generally receive a weighting that is one category more favourable than the usual risk weight on the bank’s claim.

Sources: BIS (2001)

### Table 2: Capital Requirements (%) as Rating Fall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>PD</th>
<th>Current Capital</th>
<th>Standardized Approach</th>
<th>IRB Foundation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBB</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30.96</td>
<td>30.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>47.04</td>
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### Table 3: \( BRW_c \) Associated with Representative PD Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PD (%)</th>
<th>( BRW_c )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>125</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>192</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>331</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BIS (2001)

### Table 4: \( BRW_R \) Associated with Representative PD Values

<table>
<thead>
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<th>PD (%)</th>
<th>( BRW_R )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>104</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>137</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>195</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>310</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>479</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: BIS (2001)
Making Health Care Accountable: Why Performance-based Funding of Health Services in Developing Countries is getting more Attention** - A Review

Nkenchor N. Igue*

I. Introduction

Developing countries and their international partners are increasingly adopting methods of financing health care activities that link the availability of funding to concrete, measurable results on the ground. This was advocated in the World Bank Development Report (1993) Investing in Health - even when little resources were available for this type of financing as at that time. Over time, much experimentation has taken place, and we are seeing with clarity the importance, as well as the challenges of performance-based financing for achieving national and global health goals. The authors looked at the advantages which performance-based health funding confers on developing countries, with regards to being able to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The objective of this article is to look at why performance-based funding of health services in developing countries is receiving more attention, so as to enable them achieve their national health goals.

II. Synopsis of the Article

Government and partner agencies are interested in performance-based financing of health for a number of reasons. First, there is a growing focus globally on achieving measurable results with development assistance, and performance-based financing spotlighting such results. In terms of health care, these results are being closely tracked as governments and their partners strive to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Second, there is great need for

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*Nkenchor is a staff of the Research and Statistics Department, Central Bank of Nigeria, Abuja.
development assistance to be tailored towards the attainment of the health MDGs. Also, linking the availability of financing to measurable results, whether in terms of changes in health services, is consistent with the objective of making service providers more accountable. Linking financial payments to the job done can be a tremendous encouragement for those providing the services, because it exposes their performance to their clients and others footing the bill. The 1993 World Development Report advocated the expanded use of public monies to pay private non-governmental organizations and doctors and clinics to deliver basic health services to the poor. Performance-based contracts between the government and these private providers are the principal instrument for putting this recommendation into practice.

Performance-based financing in health is now being widely and actively practiced at several levels of the health care system. First, Governments of developing countries pay health care providers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector for delivering essential health services to poor households on a performance basis. The authors made a case study of Guatemala, which successfully implemented, on a large scale, the contracting of non-governmental organizations to deliver health services. By 2000, 89 NGOs under 137 separate contracts provided health care to about 3.7 million of Guatemala's population of 14 million. The contracts specify a range of maternal and child health services and prevention and treatment of a number of diseases, including malaria. The NGOs are paid about $8 for each person served, mostly in cash but also in kind, in the form of such items as vaccines and medicines. Payments are released quarterly, once performance has been checked and verified.

Performance was measured by a series of indicators, including coverage of immunization and prenatal care, distribution of iron sulfate tablets to pregnant women and children, and frequency of home visits by the NGO outreach staff. Private firms have been hired to develop the monitoring system, which also looks at the accounting practices of the NGOs. The contracting system adopted in Guatemala yielded some positive results, and has produced important gains in health service delivery. Immunization rates in Guatemala rose from 69 per cent to 87 per cent between 1997 and 2001. Household surveys now under way
will be able to assess the impact of the programme on mother and child health outcomes.

Again, the central government determines the transfer of funds to local governments on the basis of their performance in strengthening health services. In the World Bank supported Family Health Project in Brazil, the central government makes per capita transfers to the local municipalities on the basis of planned increases in certain services, such as safe delivery of babies for low-income women, monitoring of infants' nutritional status and growth, and treatment of poor children for various illnesses. If the municipalities reach the agreed targets and others set for them, they will continue to be eligible for future financial transfers; otherwise, the level of central government support will be reduced and other remedial measures put in place in an effort to improve the targeting and effectiveness of the activities of those under performing municipalities.

Also, donors release funds (disbursements) to recipients in developing countries as and when certain key health targets are achieved. A number of innovative programmes are in place to make donor financing of health programmes conditional on successful performance on ground. A good example is the World Bank's credit “buy down” programme for polio eradication. Under the programme, countries receive low-interest loans to purchase polio vaccines in an effort to eliminate the last remaining pockets of the disease that persist in Africa and South Asia. If the vaccine is judged to be purchased, delivered, and administered in a timely and effective manner, additional resources in a trust fund financed by Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the United Nations Foundations, and Rotary International are used to buy down the interest and principal repayment on the loan, thus converting it to a grant. The authors mentioned that Nigeria and Pakistan also benefited from polio eradication projects for about $50 million.

The recent experience with performance-based financing in health has been encouraging. When properly designed, performance-oriented contracts can help to stimulate individual providers, such as doctors, nurses, midwives, and village health workers, to expand their coverage, reach poor people and
enhance the quality of what they do. Even when the contract is between a central government and local authorities or between an international development assistance agency and a government, improvement in programme performance can also be stimulated. Performance-based financing is helpful in focusing all resources to the services produced and their impact on health and nutritional status of the intended population, rather than simply counting inputs such as drugs, doctors, ambulances, hospitals buildings and equipment.

But performance-based financing for health must also overcome a number of serious hurdles to work well. One is the difficulty of measuring performance quickly and accurately, as data on such key outcomes can be hard to monitor in the poorest regions and countries. Again, is the problem of widespread lack of capacity in ministries of health to design, negotiate and enforce contracts with NGOs and private health care providers. Lastly, is the risk that performance-based financing might be perceived as a harsh or unfair imposition of conditions by the financing source on the health service providers.

The authors concluded that performance-based financing for health is not only likely to continue, but expand due to many factors. They include government and donor concern for health outcomes; interest in improved measurement of results; the push for greater accountability of health care providers to their clients and to governments and for stronger accountability of governments to donor agencies; and a recognition that NGOs and the private sector can, in some cases, deliver essential health services to poor people more efficiently than the public sector. It is important for the developing community to contribute to monitor closely these promising experiments in performance-based financing and to disseminate and apply the lessons of success and failure as rapidly as possible to maximize the benefits of development assistance in pursuit of the attainment of the health Millennium Development Goals.

III. Comments

This article supports the output-based funding of health care projects, being advocated by developed countries, governments and donor agencies. From its
experience over time, the performance-based funding has the potential of helping to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); subsequently helping in reducing poverty pervading people in low-income countries, who hitherto, had no access to some basic health care and social amenities. It is also in tandem with the theme of the 2004 World Development Report - Making Services Work for Poor People - which provides a practical framework for making services that contribute to human development work for poor people.

Despite the challenges being posed, performance-based funding of health services in developing countries is getting more attention for so many reasons:

- It increased access to health services, which was not at the expense of equity;
- It helps to focus all resources on the services produced and their impact on health and nutritional status of the intended population, rather than simply counting inputs such as drugs, doctors, ambulances, hospitals, buildings and equipments;
- There is value for monies being spent, in the sense that it gives room for greater accountability of service providers; and
- It helps partner agencies to allocate resources to countries and programmes that demonstrate progress as measured by performance indicators.

A basic service such as health care is a public responsibility. Therefore, by financing, providing, or regulating the services that contribute to health outcomes, governments around the world demonstrate their responsibility for the health of their people. If these services are left to private/market forces, it will not trickle down to the targeted poor; and that basic health services is considered as fundamental human right if the MDGs are to be achieved. Irrespective of the challenges posed to the public of these basic health care deliveries, governments have to see how collaboration could be made with the private sector, communities and outside partners/donors, to meet this
fundamental responsibility and achieve the MDGs.

This article has varied implications for the Government of Nigeria with regard to improving the well-being of Nigerians and achieving the health related MDGs. They are:

- Government has to intervene in health care delivery so as to control communicable diseases, protect poor people from impoverishing health expenditures, and disseminate information about home-based health and nutrition practices, especially in outreach services, such as immunization, which can be contracted out, but should be publicly financed;

- Basic health services provided by government should be made accountable, to enable a wide coverage of the populace and achieve success;

- Database for these health indicators should be built with great importance attached to accuracy and should be verifiable;

- A concerted effort should be in place to raise the quality and comprehensiveness of national monitoring systems to track health performance; and

- There should be a shift in Ministry of Health's fundamental mission and operating mode, so as to implement a large-scale performance-based system. This will aid the Ministry of Health to design, negotiate and enforce performance contract with NGOs and private health care providers.
Towards Developing a Vibrant Bonds Market in Nigeria** - A Review

Salam, N. Gbadebo*

I. Highlights of the Paper

A bond is defined as a contract that promises to pay fixed schedules of interest in the future in exchange for cash now. Long-term economic growth requires investments in a number of lines such as plant and machinery, the building of an engineering infrastructure and development of skills for doing things. Although such investments require long-term finance, the bulk of finance available in Nigeria is short-term, hence a call for the development of the country's capital market.

The two objectives of this paper are to understand the major reasons for the poor performance of the bonds market and to put forward proposals that will enhance its performance in the next decade. Among the several studies that have considered the economic case for issuing bonds is the conventional macroeconomic argument which believes that bond finance is less expansionary than money finance and that the expansion is sometimes undesirable. There is also macroeconomic argument which suggests that bonds are issued for different reasons. It is argued that corporate borrowers use debt market to obtain working capital and new equipment.

Apart from bonds owners that are more willing to bear the additional cost in terms of interest payable on the loan stock, governments use debt markets to acquire funds to finance various public expenditures including infrastructure. It is argued that corporate bond markets with their long-term institutional investors help unleash major forces of savings that can be channeled into important investments in local economic development. Most bonds issued in

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Nigeria are project-tied bonds. It is usually expected that the project would have been evaluated and considered viable in the sense that it will be able to service the loans raised to execute it. With the recent rise in interest rates, the cost of raising funds in the capital market is becoming competitive.

Firth (1976) listed some of the costs of debenture holding to include underwriting fees, stock exchange fees and printing expenses. He stated that such costs are more expensive than those relating to short-term finance, although short-term finance will probably have to be raised more often. The bonds market in Nigeria can be classified into several types including government and corporate securities. Government securities consist of Federal Government Development Stock, Treasury Certificates (TCs), Treasury Bonds and the development bonds issued by state and local governments while corporate securities are mainly in form of debenture of loan stocks.

In another classified scheme that uses time dimension where instruments are categorized into medium and long-term bonds, the bond market is described as an organized market for standardized marketable loans with medium to long-term maturities. Since 1977, a number of state governments including former Bendel, Kaduna, Ogun, Delta and Lagos have issued revenue bonds to raise money from the capital market.

In 1989, Treasury Bills (Bonds) (TBs) were introduced to minimize debt service payments that would follow the policy of interest rate deregulation adopted under the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). When the auction system for the floatation of TBs and TCs was being introduced, the Federal Government wanted part of the outstanding short-term securities converted to fixed interest bonds. The corporate bond which constitutes the other segment of the bonds market is issued by the private sector operators who promise to pay a specified percentage of par values (interest) on designated dates usually twice a year and to repay the principal value of the bond at maturity. To avoid running counter to legal issues, companies try as much as possible to meet their obligations as and when due.

There are several reasons why bonds market declined in Nigeria and these
include general decline in the economy, low yield of the instruments, the rising level of inflation, and high default rates. Among factors that should be taken into consideration in reforming the nation's bonds market are macroeconomic factors, demand and supply factors as well as various institutions operating in the market. Such institutions include the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Federal Government of Nigeria, rating agencies, issuing houses, and stock brokerage firms.

It is recommended in the paper that reforms should take place in the legal framework; there should be institutional changes; improvement in the macroeconomic environment; and better professional ethics. Apart from advocating for a need to promulgate a law that would regulate the public agency bond issue in order to set an upper limit for debt limits, there is a need for all companies listed on the stock exchange to seek a rating which should be continuously monitored.

Other recommendations include: Government issued fixed income securities of at least 5 years duration should be exempted from taxation; improvement in the macroeconomic environment; rein the rate of savings by increasing productivity; inducement of people to bring cash outside the banks to the banking system and; adequate capitalization of brokerage and dealing firms.

II. Comments

This paper has taken a look at a very important aspect of Nigeria's financial market going by the fact that bonds constitute a major instrument used to finance projects which require long-term capital. The topic of the paper is quite relevant especially at this period when the composition of the nation's financial market is such that the Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) that dominate the market cannot provide long-term capital for companies that engage in long-term projects.

However, the paper did not introduce the topic well enough in that the problems associated with developing bonds market in Nigeria were not given adequate treatment. Also, the paper did not explain how and to what extent the
use of bonds contributed to the growth of the economy over the years. This could be done by picking as examples some companies that have raised bonds to finance their activities. The usefulness or otherwise of such funding could be seen by comparing the performance of such companies before and after the bonds are issued. In addition, the paper would have been made more robust if it had taken a look at bonds market in some other countries, developing and developed. By so doing, the bonds market in Nigeria would have been well evaluated vis-à-vis what obtains in those countries.

Another weak point of the paper is that too little attention was paid to the review of literature. The portion devoted to the literature in the paper was too small for any meaningful review to take place. In addition to this, reviewing of more papers earlier done on the bonds market would have made the paper more robust. Finally, there were some referenced papers that could not be found quoted in the body of the paper.
SUBMISSION OF MANUSCRIPT TO CBN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW

1. Three (3) hardcopies and a softcopy of the original manuscript should be addressed to the:

   Editor-in-chief
   CBN Economic and Financial Review
   Research and Statistics Department
   Central Bank of Nigeria
   P.M.B.0187, Garki, Abuja

   The softcopy of the papers can also be submitted via email as electronic document, preferably Microsoft word document to either of the following email addresses: cnomordi@cenbank.org; aoadenuga@cenbank.org.

   The article should not be more than 30 pages on A4 size paper and should be typed double-spaced with a margin of 1.5 inches on all sides. The manuscript must be accompanied with a diskette copy and a letter of submission written in English. Submission of a paper is assumed to imply that its contents represent original and unpublished work and is not under consideration elsewhere for publication. Normally, the review process is expected to take not more than three months. There is neither a submission charge nor page fee. A return address (postal/email) should be indicated.

2. Papers may be accepted or returned for specified revisions. A paper is expected to be published approximately six months from the date of acceptance.

3. Comments on published article/notes and reviews of up to 2,000 words will also be considered for publication. Notes deal with relevant topics not meeting full length articles. Reviews may be about articles published recently by this journal or elsewhere. A copy of the review/comments should be sent to the articles' author for clarification of any points or misunderstandings.

4. All submitted manuscripts are referred to an Editorial Board comprising of an in-house editorial committee and external referees. All comments by the referees will be sent to the author(s) together with a decision of the Editorial Board.

5. The purpose and scope of the article should be clearly stated in an abstract summarizing the article's essential points. The abstract should be typed on a separate page and should be between 80-100 words in length. In addition, the JEL classification code (s) as well as keywords should be clearly indicated on the abstract page.

6. The author's institutional affiliation and necessary background information on the article should appear at the foot of the first page. Footnote to the text should be listed at the end, followed by the list of references.

7. References for quotations or statements should be in parentheses in the text, not as notes. E.g. Hess (1906:20) or Cagan (1958) or Majer (1975:35). Where more than three authors are involved, cite senior author and use et al., E.G. Johnson et al. (1988).
8. Citations listed under the reference sections must begin on a new page. All entries must be typed double-spaced, listed alphabetically by last name of senior author and chronologically for two or more articles by the same author. The typed layout must conform to the following examples:


9. All tabular materials should be separated from the text in a series of tables numbered consecutively in Arabic numerals preferably in Microsoft Excel. Each table should be typed double-spaced and identified by a short descriptive at the top. Notes for table should be at the bottom of each table, before the source, and marked by lower case superscript letters. Appropriately placed tables should be indicated in the text.

10. Diagrams, graphs, charts, etc. must be separated from the text and clearly drawn in black ink on a white paper with all axes clearly positioned. They should be submitted in a form suitable for reproduction without redrawing, preferably in camera-ready artwork.

11. Where mathematical equations and formulae are used, they should be typed clearly. Notations, exponents, etc, which are simple to reproduce should be used. The equations should be numbered consecutively in Arabic numerals. The full mathematical workings necessary for justifying each step of the argument should accompany all the articles of a mathematical nature. This is meant to assist the reviewers and will not be published.